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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Contestation and Reconstruction: Natural 
Capital and Post-Conflict Development in 
Borderland Regions
Roger Zetter* and Brad K. Blitz†
stability
Though often remote and underdeveloped, borderlands are contested territories. 
The incorporation of borderlands into the post-conflict state highlights many 
important land-related paradigms, including the conversion of natural resources 
for economic, political, and civic purposes. This article explores the relationship 
between the natural resources of borderlands and their post-conflict development, 
management, and sustainability. Based on case study data and secondary material 
drawn from Croatia and Cyprus, the paper seeks to establish how the interplay 
of cross-border, national, and sub-national interests in post-conflict settings may 
contribute to the creation of new opportunities for economic development and 
the reconstruction of borderlands. It considers how the exploitation of natural 
resources may advance the agendas for the political development and incorporation 
of previous sites of contestation; and equally how their incorporation may constrain 
policies of sustainability, potentially giving rise to new conflicts. The paper sheds 
light on issues such as: the conversion of borderland natural capital to political 
capital as post-conflict states assert sovereignty claims and consolidate territorial 
identity; the ways in which the non-monetary value of natural capital is reconceived 
as commercial use value in post-conflict reconstruction; and the involvement of 
non-state actors and civil society in promoting environmental agendas, often as a 
counterbalance to state power.
Introduction
Land is contested territory, both literally and 
metaphorically. The aim of this paper is to 
examine the nature of that contestation in a 
specific context: that is, by shedding light on 
the relationship between natural capital and 
post-conflict development in border regions. 
The particularity of border areas and the 
nature of contestation which takes place in 
these locations offer the potential for origi-
nal insights into the ways in which natural 
resources are valued and converted. 
We argue that post-conflict economic 
conditions enable states to reconceptualise 
the value of natural resources and convert 
them for both commercial and political 
uses, through tourism development, sub-
stantial urban expansion, and more inten-
sive exploitation of agricultural resources. 
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While this may be a general feature of 
development in many states, we note that 
in post-conflict situations the conversion of 
natural capital, especially in border areas, 
has a particular symbolic political value, in 
that it is through their exploitation that the 
post-conflict state may assert or re-assert its 
claims to sovereignty by consolidating its 
territorial identity. Further we argue that 
such conversion is of additional political 
relevance since, even though borderlands 
may appear to be at the physical periphery 
of the state, given the legacies of conflict in 
often devastated regions the symbolic value 
of these border areas elevates their stand-
ing in post-conflict state. Finally, we argue 
that the processes of post-conflict conver-
sion are multi-levelled, involving not only 
national actors but also local institutions 
and supranational organisations, and that 
there is a profound temporal dimension 
to the exploitation of natural resources in 
the post-conflict state. These factors create 
opportunities for more sustainable develop-
ment in the post-conflict state and the pro-
tection of natural resources. 
The first part of the article reviews the 
context and outlines the problematic before 
elaborating a conceptual framework which 
seeks to establish how the interplay of 
cross-border and national interests in post-
conflict settings contributes to the creation 
of new economic opportunities and political 
demands for the development and recon-
struction of borderlands. We suggest that an 
understanding of the processes which shape 
post-conflict borderlands can be represented 
by the conjuncture of developmental, politi-
cal, and environmental interests. 
The following section explores the concep-
tual framework by drawing on our research 
on Croatia and Cyprus, contexts in which 
post-conflict border areas have remained 
politically and environmentally sensitive 
and contested. We argue that the contested 
nature of post-conflict border areas, notably 
where new (or reconfigured) states have been 
formed from that conflict, creates a novel 
context in which the economic exploitation 
of their natural capital constitutes a crucial 
mechanism for political incorporation and 
‘territorial consolidation’. Natural capital 
is considered one of the five assets that sit 
at the centre of the Sustainable Livelihoods 
Framework (SLF)1; however, the degree to 
which it is captured by the post-conflict state 
is under-theorised. Although the SLF recog-
nises that institutions and political actors 
shape livelihoods, and that sustainable rural 
development is intended to improve the well-
being of poor households, it is not focused at 
the level of the state and the questions of ter-
ritoriality which arise from consideration of 
border regions. We suggest the value of our 
approach is that it offers new ways of under-
standing the significance and impact of this 
borderland conversion process on the social, 
environmental, and commercial landscapes, 
the almost inevitable depletion of natural 
capital, and the associated challenges of 
sustainability. 
While there are other situations where 
one might explore contestation over natu-
ral resources in borderlands, the selected 
case study states (Cyprus and Croatia) are 
located in one of the world’s most environ-
mentally-protected regions, namely the 
European Union; furthermore, their par-
ticular histories are revealing regarding the 
ways in which these political spaces have 
been affected by post-conflict development. 
Unlike other regions the extraction of natu-
ral resources and the level of environmental 
protection in the European Union are highly 
regulated. While Croatia only joined the EU 
on 1 July 2013, it had previously been sub-
ject to international oversight as part of the 
concluding peace agreements which saw the 
eastern part of the country administered by 
the United Nations. Similarly, we note that 
Cyprus, an EU member state since 20042, was 
also home to a longstanding UN presence 
and the subject of much international diplo-
macy, as well as legal rulings by the European 
Court of Human Rights that set out objective 
legal norms for resolving outstanding territo-
rial claims on the divided island (Zetter 2011; 
Williams & Gürel 2011). We therefore suggest 
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that these two examples provide some of the 
best case studies by which to examine the 
political conversion of natural resources.
Conflict and the creation of 
borderlands
Border areas, notably in less economically-
developed regions, are often remote and 
relatively inaccessible. Until the past two 
decades or so, the relative stability of state 
territoriality and borders has complemented 
this sense of isolation and neglect in prefer-
ence to the exploitation and incorporation 
of the territorial ‘heartland’. Although excep-
tions exist, seclusion and lack of contesta-
tion have afforded a means of safeguarding 
their natural capital from large-scale inten-
sive exploitation; ecological wealth and 
bio-diversity have been protected, in some 
sense, by default. In this setting it is impor-
tant to note the particularities of ‘natural 
capital’. While it may have direct uses - for 
example through consumption of foods - 
or indirect uses - in the form of convertible 
materials such as timber - unlike other forms 
of capital the value of natural capital cannot 
be restricted to an instrumental calculus. 
This is one of the shortcomings of the SLF. 
Indeed, there are many aesthetic, non-mate-
rial, and post-material ways in which natural 
resources are given value today (Dasgupta 
2001; Dasgupta 2010). The Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) emphasises 
natural capital as services and creators of 
value, rather than as stock (2003), a view 
which is shared in much influential writing 
on ecosystem and natural resource manage-
ment today (Benton 1996; Moog & Stones 
2009; Perkins 2007; Van Dyne 2012).
In recent years, the seclusion of borderlands 
has declined, not least through the advent of 
war. Almost by definition, intra- and inter-
state conflict frequently spill over into border 
areas in both protracted and more episodic 
situations. Examples of this trend include 
Israel/Palestine, Kashmir, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, Darfur and Chad, Rwanda, Burundi 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Myanmar and Bangladesh, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, and also where new states have 
emerged from within former national entities 
such as former Yugoslavia and the Caucasus 
region in the 1990s; these conflicts increas-
ingly pressurise natural capital both during 
and after war. 
In several ways war, and the immediate 
aftermath of war, produces dramatic impacts 
on the natural resources of a country: the 
borderlands may be particularly vulnerable 
to these impacts. The artefacts of war - muni-
tions, mines, chemical weapons, military 
movements - have produced highly destruc-
tive and sometimes very visible impacts on the 
natural environment (Barakat 2005; Goudie 
2013), not just in borderlands. For example, 
Goudie writes that, decades after the end 
of hostilities in North Africa, ‘wheel tracks 
and degraded vegetation produced in World 
War II are still present in the desert’ (2013: 
49). The civil wars in a number of Central 
American states and in Southeast Asia in the 
1970s and 1980s also illustrate these conse-
quences. Paradoxically, the natural capital of 
borderlands may also be protected during 
and in the immediate aftermath of war, since 
landmines and military exclusions zones 
limit human intervention. The Green Line 
buffer zone separating the Greek-Cypriot and 
Turkish-Cypriot after the 1974 invasion has 
become an, albeit thin, haven for the natural 
landscape to reassert itself. 
Contemporary conflicts can produce large 
numbers of refugees, whose spontaneous 
cross-border migration and encampment 
severely impact borderland economies and 
their natural environments both during 
and after the conflict. In the early 1990s, 
the impact of more than one million 
Mozambican refugees on the natural capi-
tal of southern Malawi, for example, has left 
a generation-long legacy of severe defor-
estation and erosion. The massive influx of 
Rwandan refugees into what is now the DRC 
has had dramatic and enduring negative 
impacts on the fragile equatorial flora and 
fauna of that country. 
Similarly, in many recent violent conflicts 
- notably in Bosnia, Croatia, West Africa, and 
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the Caucasus region - the mass forced expul-
sion of people from their habitual places of 
residence and the expropriation of their land 
and property have been the principal instru-
ments, if not the defining characteristic, of 
the conflicts themselves. Although of course 
not limited to border regions, these locations 
are nevertheless particularly susceptible to 
ethnic cleansing through ‘deterritorialisa-
tion’ and thus ‘re-territorialisation’ to assert 
newly formed nationalist interests (Blitz 
2005; Blitz 2011). 
Conceptual framework
The above evidence demonstrates that our 
analysis cannot ignore the impact of war 
on the natural resources of border regions 
and, more especially, the carry-over effects 
in the aftermath of war, often as a driver of 
development. For example, Besley & Persson 
note that state capacities, including natural 
resources, are often considered in the pro-
cess of state-building in order to promote 
development and growth (2010).
As significant as war and its legacy are, 
longer-term post-conflict situations pose 
much more enduring impacts on the natu-
ral environment of border areas. Far beyond 
the post-war peacebuilding and reconcili-
ation processes of land and property res-
titution or restorative justice (Alden Wiley 
2003; Fitzpatrick 2002; Pankhurst 1999; 
Pantuliano 2009; RSQ 2000; UNHCR 1995, 
1996, 1997, 1998; Zetter 2005, 2011), a con-
sistent feature of post-conflict adjustment is 
the revaluation and reconceptualisation of 
the role, purpose, and resources of border 
areas, especially water (Weinthal et al. 2014). 
In contrast to war, the post-conflict impact 
of human agency on these areas is deliber-
ate rather than a by-product, tends to be 
spatially extensive rather than localised to 
conflict-affected areas, and is both highly 
symbolic and instrumental. Paradoxically, it 
is post-conflict adaptation and conversion 
- not war itself - which accelerates vulner-
ability and intensifies pressures for natural 
resource exploitation as an enduring rather 
than incidental process. 
Three bodies of literature inform our 
understanding of the processes which shape 
the above post-conflict paradigm.
Development as conversion - towards a 
political economy approach
One of the central features of economic devel-
opment theory is the notion of conversion. 
In classical accounts, conversion serves as an 
analytical bridge describing the relationship 
between capital inputs and economic output; 
it also applies to alternative theories of devel-
opment which claim that other forms of cap-
ital, traditionally considered exogenous to 
the production process (e.g. human, social, 
and cultural capital), nonetheless influence 
the process of development (Coleman 1990; 
Putnam 1993; Putnam 2000; Stiglitz 1975). 
However, scholars are divided over the way 
in which conversion takes place. Investment 
theories of development (Rostow 1960) 
contrast with human capital theory (Arrow 
1973; Spence 1974; Stiglitz 1975), whilst 
sociological analysis stresses conversion as 
an essentially cultural exchange that rein-
forces positions of power (Bourdieu 1990). 
Inevitably, in whatever way conversion takes 
place, the context is defined by political aspi-
rations and processes taking place at local, 
national, and international levels. 
In the case of natural capital, the debate 
over conversion has shifted over time. The 
contemporary period introduces new and 
often contradictory challenges at both the 
micro and macro levels regarding the role 
and use of natural resources within the 
wider economic and political framework. 
Reflecting the evolution of concepts of 
sustainability, natural capital is decreas-
ingly defined as a state’s stock of natural 
resources that are fed into the production 
process, but rather as potentially renewable 
resources and services that may bind the 
environment, economy, and society together 
(Dasgupta 2001; Dasgupta 2010; MEA 2003; 
Millennium Project 2005), though they are 
often captured by political elites in the post-
conflict state (Kurz 2013). In this context, 
conversion cannot be separated from the 
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concept of sustainability, which relates to the 
way in which states maintain and enhance 
their natural resources, as well as human and 
social resources (Hawken et al. 1999), often 
in support of largely urban-based develop-
ment agendas (Zetter 2004). How natural 
capital is valued by different stakeholders 
is therefore a pressing question for states 
and environmental activists (Benton 1996; 
Cairncross 1991; Dasgupta 2001; Dasgupta 
2010; Gilpin 1999; IUCN 1998; Kurz 2013; 
Wood & Glasson 2006.).
In respect to post-conflict situations, the 
ways in which natural resources in general 
(and borderlands specifically) are valued, 
audited, and converted in the context of 
development discourse - and sustainability 
conceptualised - are a source of consider-
able political and economic contestation. 
Challenging notions of sustainability, post-
conflict states often opt for rapid economic 
growth and typically use natural resources 
to revitalise agriculture and building materi-
als industries (Zetter 1992; Zetter 2005), as 
well as other commercial activities such as 
tourism (Baldwin 2000; Winter 2007), and 
mineral and timber extraction for high-value 
international commodity markets (Kurz 
2013). Yet the presence of natural wealth 
does not necessarily promote effective devel-
opment, as Kurz argues in the cases of Chile, 
Peru, Argentina, and Uruguay, where exten-
sive natural resources did not enhance state 
capacity (2013). The dialogue between com-
plementary and competing interests, use and 
non-use values, exploitative and sustainable 
methods of production, cultural symbolism, 
and the legacy of conflict thus provides a 
vital arena for the analysis of changing per-
spectives on the potential for natural capital 
development (Dasgupta 2010). 
In other contexts, expansion of oil extrac-
tion in Angola at the end of the civil war, 
precious minerals extraction in the DRC 
throughout an unremittingly turbulent 
period of civil war and fragile peace, and the 
rapid expansion of ‘environmentally-friendly’ 
international tourism in Slovenia exemplify 
diverse ways in which post-conflict economic 
strategies have been pursued by the state, 
in both border and ‘heartland’ locations. 
Where it is deployed, external development 
assistance may mediate the environmental 
impacts by making development conditional 
on the creation of sustainable practices. We 
note, for example, that the World Bank has 
recently developed an Environmental and 
Social Framework which lays out its commit-
ment to sustainable development, through a 
policy and a set of environmental and social 
standards designed to support borrowers’ 
projects (World Bank 2014); the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
has similarly sought to embed sustainability 
across its projects (2014). 
But despite the high level discourses on 
development at UN fora - such as the UN 
General Assembly’s Resolution The Future 
We Want (UNGA 2012) and the Rio+20/UN 
Conference on Sustainable Development 
(See also: Millennium Project 2005; MEA 
2003, World Bank 2014) - until now such 
instances of environmentally sustainable 
development have been very limited. Rather, 
these long-term objectives have been sub-
ordinated to market-driven imperatives of 
neo-liberal economic policies and structural 
readjustment programmes enforced through 
donor-driven reconstruction programmes 
and the adventurism of transnational cor-
porations. At the same time, competing 
domestic interests over access to, and use of, 
natural resources place post-conflict states 
under increased pressure and may challenge 
their very legitimacy, for example as we wit-
ness in South Sudan. 
Post-conflict transformation
Exponential growth in the study of post-
conflict peacebuilding and state transforma-
tion is particularly relevant to the analysis 
of natural resource management in border-
lands. Recent studies of ‘regional conflict 
formation’ (Rubin 2001) and the so-called 
‘new wars’ (Duffield 2001) argue that in this 
setting national and transnational conflicts 
arise as a result of mutually reinforcing link-
ages between military, political, economic, 
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and social networks across states. Extending 
this argument, others have made a pow-
erful case for reviewing these linkages in 
order to promote post-conflict transitions, 
which is our point of entry (Barakat 2005; 
Blitz 2005; Carbonnier 1998; Cooper & Pugh 
2004; Doyle & Sambanis 2000; Kurz 2013). 
Similarly, the work on transitions to democ-
racy, which highlights the importance of 
pacts for political change, is also central to 
our argument (Diamond & Plattner 1996; 
O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986; Shain & Linz 
1995). Although the extant literature does 
not integrate the exploitation of natural cap-
ital and the territorial phenomena of border-
lands within this nexus, it implicitly forms 
part of these linkages as follows.
Within the context of these linkages, the 
now well-established international and 
national machinery of post-conflict (re-)
construction - humanitarian intervention, 
restitution, peacebuilding missions to sup-
port civil society, governance structures and 
institutions, and the imperative for eco-
nomic recovery and development - combines 
with domestic political agendas to establish 
(in the case of newly formed post conflict 
states), or re-establish (in the case of pre-
existing states), the claims for national ter-
ritorial control and integrity. 
First, as noted above, the imperative 
for economic development after conflict 
demands a re-evaluation of the country’s 
resource base, a process which is frequently 
driven by external donors. The same donors 
use aid and development conditionality in 
peace accords in order to rebuild civil soci-
ety and governance structures. Intending 
to reinforce peace and reconciliation, these 
objectives often become instruments for 
asserting national/ethnic interests, territo-
rial control, and thus border consolidation 
- notably in Bosnia-Herzegovina and more 
recently Kosovo and South Sudan. 
Next, typically, the constricted land areas 
of new nation states carved out of larger, pre-
existing entities combine with population 
growth caused by the mass influx of those 
forced to migrate, or as a result of ethnic 
cleansing, to create both additional pressures 
and the potential to bring new land into 
productive use - for example in the Israeli 
occupied Palestinian areas of the West Bank. 
Border areas are far from immune from the 
demand for land for new housing as well as 
commercial, industrial, and agricultural use: 
the case of Cyprus, as we shall argue below, 
illustrates the extremity of these pressures.
Underscoring these outcomes lie the 
political and military objectives of defining 
the ‘identity’ of the newly-formed or recon-
firmed state. Challenging Anderson’s clas-
sic account of ‘imagined communities’ with 
boundaries unknown to the majority of the 
population (1991), our contention is that 
boundaries are highly salient to post-conflict 
communities. Despite their potential vulner-
ability, protecting and incorporating border 
areas through development becomes a vital 
objective since, in both a material and sym-
bolic sense, boundaries are an existential def-
inition of the limits of newly-found national 
sovereignty and identity, hence the Israeli 
push to create new homes and settler com-
munities in E-1 between East Jerusalem and 
the West Bank, and the rapid urban expan-
sion by Chinese interests in Lhasa, Tibet, to 
name just two examples. 
Theories of sustainable development 
and critical accounts of natural resource 
management
The ‘existence value’ of natural capital has 
frequently been conceptualised as a public 
good, borne out in both recent studies and 
policy documents which consider the impact 
that environmental conservation and sus-
tainability policies have on economic well-
being and human development (Benton 
1996; Dasgupta 2001; Dasgupta 2010; 
Korten 1995; Sen 1999; Seers 1979; Pearce 
2002; World Bank 2014).3 Following this line, 
a significant divide in the literature on natu-
ral resource management is between policy-
based and instrumental approaches (Glasson 
2005; IUCN 1998; OECD 1995; Therivel 
2004) and critical accounts of power. This 
has particular relevance to our argument. 
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Studies of the ways in which natural resource 
management operates in a global economy 
with pressures above and below the state 
(Cairncross 1993) are complemented by 
social ecology perspectives which provide 
environmentally-oriented accounts of the 
relationship between ecological infrastruc-
ture, the economy, and cultural, political, and 
social structures which mobilise local actors 
(Benton 1996; Guha 1994; Pepper 1993).
The neo-liberal development paradigm of 
market enablement, combined with the asser-
tion of state sovereignty, challenges these 
precepts of sustainability in borderlands. 
For example, for many years the Chittagong 
Hills Territory on the Bangladesh-Myanmar 
border has been the location of low-level 
conflicts based on ethnic disputes over natu-
ral resources and settlement rights, in part 
following the Kaptai Dam construction and 
hydro-electric project. This region has wit-
nessed the erosion and degradation of fer-
tile soil and important stocks of timber and 
bamboo are under threat as populations are 
forcibly moved and new economic activities 
are exploited for territorial consolidation.
Exploring the borders
Offering contrasting post-conflict situations, 
Cyprus and Croatia reveal a range of para-
doxical and contradictory outcomes from 
these national developmental, political, and 
environmental processes and the reinforc-
ing linkages between military, political, eco-
nomic, and social networks across states, 
which define the paradigm that we observed 
above. While their histories of conflict may 
be separated by more than 15 years, the 
problematic resolution of past invasion, not 
to mention their status as old and new EU 
states, raises interesting points of contrast. 
Cyprus
After more than a decade of low-level inter-
communal conflict since independence in 
1960, and following a swift and powerful mil-
itary intervention in 1974, the Turkish army 
took control of over 40 per cent of the island 
of Cyprus to protect the Turkish-Cypriot 
minority from their perceived political 
annihilation by the substantially larger 
Greek-Cypriot majority - at the time, proté-
gés of the mainland Greek military dictator-
ship (Hitchens 1984; Koumoulides 1986; 
Calotychos 1998). Mercifully limited combat 
and violence between the two ethnic popula-
tions - at least in comparison with later civil 
wars in Bosnia, Rwanda, and the Sudan - was 
counterbalanced by a rapid and total eth-
nic separation of the two previously mixed 
communities. Nearly half the country’s then-
population of about 500,000 became ‘refu-
gees’ in their own country.4 Dispossessed of 
their land and livelihoods, Greek-Cypriots 
forcibly migrated to the south of the UN 
demilitarised Green Line, Turkish-Cypriots 
to the north. The Greek-Cypriots - approxi-
mately 80 per cent of the then-population - 
remain the internationally recognised de jure 
government of the island; however, de facto, 
and despite numerous international peace 
efforts, two mono-ethnic mini-states have 
developed. For 30 years they had been rig-
idly separated by the mile-wide Green Line 
‘buffer zone’ which weaves a coast-to-coast 
east-west alignment across the island for 
180 kilometres, dividing the national capital 
Nicosia en route. In effect, it has operated 
as a national border and virtually no cross-
border population movement by the Cypriot 
population was possible. Since 2005 a thaw-
ing of relations between the two sides has 
opened up several border crossings, but, as 
yet, countless UN-brokered negotiations 
have not resulted in political reconciliation 
or economic reintegration. 
This brief résumé sets the context for 
examining the borderlands. Although never 
considered permanent, the protracted divi-
sion of the island has created a strong physi-
cal barrier with a number of significant 
impacts on the natural capital of the border-
lands. Of several processes of natural capi-
tal conversion of this borderland, three are 
highlighted here. For the first few years after 
the conflict, the borderland, on both sides, 
was immune from economic and political 
development pressures. Neither those areas 
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(which had commercial or agricultural value 
because of their location or pre-war use), nor 
other areas of natural landscape value which 
had remained un- or underdeveloped, were 
exploited in any significant way. There were 
two reasons for this. First, as in so many civil 
wars, a fragile peace held out the (unrealistic) 
prospect of repatriation; this uncertainty was 
counterbalanced by the continuing potential 
threat of further territorial incursions by the 
Turkish army occupying the north. In this 
way the borderlands, and of course other 
lands vacated by the population exchange, 
temporarily fell into neglect or remained 
unexploited. Second, dispossession of land 
ownership and use rights - immensely strong 
cultural and economic symbols for both eth-
nic communities (Bryant 2010; Hadjipavlou-
Trigeorgis 1998) - accompanied the massive 
forced migration and exchange of popula-
tion; this caused an enormous upheaval in 
property entitlements across the island. As 
a result, land left by departing populations 
remained unused for a number of years until 
spontaneous occupation began to take place 
and the modalities of regulating temporary 
occupancy/use rights were established. 
Now, after 40 years of division, stability, 
and peace - but, of course no sense of per-
manency about the Green Line - significant 
new and permanent patterns of use and 
development have been established along 
the ‘border’. However, it is important to 
note that these changes to the natural capi-
tal are not just determined by the locational 
and resource attributes of the border areas 
themselves. In many ways they can only be 
explained by the long-term economic and 
political reformulation across the rest of the 
two quasi-independent ‘mini-states’. 
As might be expected given the small size 
of the island, the border region environ-
ments lack diversity. For the most part the 
border crosses lowland plains with, prior to 
the 1974 division, mixed agricultural, urban, 
and natural landscapes. To this extent, dif-
ferences in the subsequent patterns of natu-
ral landscape conversion either side of the 
post-1974 border tend to be far less signifi-
cant than the overall similarities in conver-
sion which have taken place. 
The second issue is urban expansion and 
conversion of natural capital. While urban 
expansion would have taken place without 
the 1974 invasion, the forced displacement 
rapidly accelerated the pace of urbanisation. 
But, more important, the post-conflict period 
has injected new dynamics and patterns to 
that process. Around the divided capital, 
Nicosia, extensive urban development has 
taken place, notably on the Greek-Cypriot 
south side where the vibrant, pre-war econ-
omy picked up very rapidly after the division 
of the island, in part as a result of the hous-
ing development to resettle the displaced 
populations from the north. On the Turkish-
Cypriot side, urban expansion to the north 
was initially much slower, given the eco-
nomic isolation of northern Cyprus and the 
much lower pressure on housing stock. But 
the scale of urban expansion has increased 
remarkably in recent years. 
An important feature of this expansion is 
that the earlier post-conflict phase, along a 
north-south axis away from the border, has 
now given way to equally strong east-west 
urbanisation along both sides of the border, 
alongside the buffer zone. Consolidation 
along the axis of the border would appear 
to reflect several factors: the sense of perma-
nency of the 1974 ‘border’; the continuity of 
peace; and a state of affairs reinforced by the 
urban development plans of both commu-
nities which were deployed to give political 
legitimacy to and strengthen each side’s ter-
ritorial claims.
The urban expansion has encroached upon 
both very fertile agricultural land which now 
commands a much higher use value for 
urban needs and, increasingly, the more envi-
ronmentally sensitive landscapes previously 
immune from development. On the north-
ern side, conversion of the natural capital 
is fast expanding into the environmentally 
sensitive foothills of the Kyrenia mountain 
range eight to ten miles from the city centre; 
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previously these landscapes were partially 
wooded rough pasture and Mediterranean 
maquis. Rapid population growth fuelled in 
the north by the importation of Anatolian 
settlers and a vibrant economy in the south 
has accelerated this process. On both the 
northern and southern sides the east-west 
expansion is now encroaching hilly outcrops 
and environmentally valuable limestone out-
liers, further diminishing the natural capital.
The urban development lacks a sustain-
able form. For the most part low-density 
and low plot ratios - typically preferred by 
Cypriots for many decades - characterise the 
urban growth despite intense pressure on 
land resources and growing awareness of the 
need to adopt sustainable policies in urban 
development plans. The political economy 
of post-conflict development along the bor-
derland, as in much of the rest of the island, 
is taking precedence over other, longer-term 
development strategies. 
In relation to the third conversion process 
- tourism - we can draw a similar conclusion. 
Mediterranean Cyprus is a tourist-dependent 
economy and it is the natural capital of the 
coastal areas which has been most impacted 
post-conflict, notably to the east but increas-
ingly to the west and the north of the island. 
Prior to the invasion, Famagusta on the east 
coast, then the second city of the island, 
was the epicentre of the island’s tourism 
industry. Cut off and isolated north of the 
Green Line after 1974, Famagusta’s tour-
ism industry instantly vanished. The many 
hotels of that era form a now deserted ghost 
town. However, a substitution process soon 
emerged given that the island’s economic 
survival was predicated on tourism. Coastal 
landscapes to the south of Famagusta, which 
had remained relatively undeveloped and 
isolated prior to 1974 (since they had less 
attractive and less accessible beaches and 
coves), came under enormous pressure. 
Now high-density tourism development on 
the Greek-Cypriot side extends south of the 
buffer zone for many miles and inland from 
the coast. Although it was not of particularly 
high landscape value, the natural capital of 
that area has been permanently lost. 
Again, this impact is not exclusive to the 
borderlands. Further from the border area, 
in the far west in the remote and environ-
mentally attractive Akamas peninsula on 
the Greek-Cypriot side, and on the equally 
attractive northern coast on the Turkish-
Cypriot side, rapacious tourism development 
has converted the natural capital of these 
landscapes of mountains, coastal plains, low-
intensity rough pasture, and maquis. 
It cannot, of course, be argued that these 
post-conflict borderlands would not have 
been converted had there been no war. Nor 
were these outcomes only confined to border 
areas - towns and coastal landscapes further 
afield from the border have been subjected 
to the same development dynamics. Rather, 
we might conclude the following. Had it 
taken place, the conversion would have been 
at a much slower rate; loss of economically-
productive land due to war and the scarcity 
of development land after the conflict has 
increased pressure on more vulnerable land-
scapes of natural capital which also happen 
to be in border areas; the twin imperatives 
of resuscitating the island’s principal indus-
try and symbolically incorporating the bor-
der areas into the new polities of the north 
and south came together to drive a political 
economy of borderland conversion. 
Croatia
Natural capital conversion featured in 
Croatia’s post-war development planning in 
two important ways: first, the tourism sec-
tor was promoted, just as it had been rapidly 
expanding before the war; second, ethno-
political tensions which had been exacer-
bated by the war and subsequent occupation 
played out in discriminatory housing poli-
cies which aimed, in part, to consolidate 
key areas of territory bordering on Croatia’s 
neighbours, in Bosnia, and, to a much lesser 
extent, Serbia. Though the greatest volume 
of damage to Croatian property was arguably 
in the Danube region neighbouring Serbia 
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- in and around the city of Vukovar - Croatia’s 
post-conflict development plan centred on 
shoring up support in the areas bordering 
Herzegovina, which were actively populated 
by Bosnian Croats. It is helpful here to review 
the history of the war in Croatia to explain 
how attention shifted from the eastern bor-
der with Serbia where the conflict was most 
intense, to a process of ethnic consolidation 
and settlement in southern areas which bor-
der on Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
In response to increased centralisation by 
the Serb-dominated elite in Belgrade, and 
on the back of rising cultural and political 
nationalism, Croatia declared its independ-
ence from the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia in June 1991 and sought to carve 
out a new life as a sovereign state. Croatia’s 
declaration of independence had been pre-
ceded by a period of increasing tensions 
between the ethnic Croat majority and the 
Serb minority that had lived on the territory 
for hundreds of years (and who had taken 
steps to create an ethnically Serb mini-state 
inside Croatia, Srpska Krajina). 
Violent clashes between members of 
Croatia’s two main ethnic communities took 
place in 1990, beginning with the August 
‘log-revolution’ when rebel Serbs under the 
leadership of Milan Babić blocked roads 
to the Croatian resorts on the Dalmatian 
coast. In March 1991, Croatian security 
forces and armed rebels came into conflict 
in the Plitvice Lakes National Park, and in 
May twelve Croatian policeman were killed 
in Borovo Selo in Eastern Slavonia near the 
fated town of Vukovar. By the middle of sum-
mer 1991 the Serbian rebels were receiv-
ing full military support from the Yugoslav 
National Army (JNA), which already had its 
sights on the soon-to-be besieged cities of 
Dubrovnik and Vukovar. By autumn 1991, 
under the command of Slobodan Milosevic, 
communist demagogues and the Croatian 
Serb leadership had launched a full-scale 
attack on the newly declared Croatian state.
The effects of the Serb-led attack were 
overwhelming. Tens of thousands of Croats 
were expelled from their homes and scores 
tortured and murdered by the occupying 
forces. More than 30 per cent of the country 
was seized by the rebels. The besieged city 
of Dubrovnik attracted much international 
attention and was quickly reconstructed 
after the UN-sponsored ceasefire of January 
1992. By contrast, the city of Vukovar on 
the eastern Danubian border with Serbia, 
which had been besieged for 87 days, was 
left in ruins for much of the 1990s. Eastern 
Slavonia remained under Serb control until 
it was handed over in January 1996 to the 
United Nations Transitional Administration 
for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) for two 
years. Other areas under Serb occupation, 
in Western Slavonia near the border with 
Bosnia and in the Dalmatian hinterland 
around Knin, were only returned to the 
Croatian government following two quick 
military invasions in summer 1995, opera-
tions Flash and Storm. 
The demographic composition of Croatia 
has been particularly affected as a result 
of refugee flows in 1991, following the ini-
tial Serb assault, and in 1995 after military 
operations Flash and Storm. The return of 
the Danube region to Croatian government 
control in 1998 and the end of the conflicts 
in Bosnia also set in motion a third series of 
refugee movements.5 
Yet, the history of the war in Croatia and 
post-conflict settlement cannot be divorced 
from the conflict in Bosnia, in which Croatia 
intervened through its support of Bosnian 
Croat militias and where it had strategic 
interests. Most controversial, Croatia was 
accused of pursuing policies to create a 
Greater Croatia in Bosnia, with several schol-
ars calling attention to the historic meeting 
between Croatian President Franjo Tudjman 
and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in 
Karađorđevo, Serbia, in March 1991, where 
discussions were held on the redistribu-
tion of territories in Bosnia between Croatia 
and Serbia.6 Both during the conflict, where 
Croatia supported the Bosnian Croat forces 
(HVO) who sought to create a mini-state of 
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Herceg-Bosna, and after the war, through its 
generous citizenship and settlement policies, 
Croatia actively intervened in Bosnia and 
invested considerable effort in the manage-
ment of the bordering lands. 
In the years following the war Croatia’s 
management of natural capital through tour-
ism development has been especially note-
worthy. Over 70 per cent of Croatia is covered 
in forest and, despite the expansion of air-
ports and motorways, much of the coastline 
from Istria down to the southernmost point 
of Dalmatia has been spared from overdevel-
opment. In addition, there is an abundance of 
fresh water supplies along the borders with 
Bosnia and Serbia which also provide areas 
of scenic beauty. There are more than eight 
airports in the main cities, ports, and coastal 
destinations, and new motorways which ena-
ble quick transfers from Zagreb to Rijeka in 
Istria and Zadar in northern Dalmatia. Some 
coastal centres, such as Zadar and Pula, have 
drawn an important share of the tourist mar-
ket away from southern Dalmatia and now 
act as significant gateways to both large and 
small resort islands. 
There have, however, been significant 
regional disparities in terms of the conserva-
tion and management of the state’s natural 
resources and several political frontiers have 
been sites of intense natural capital conver-
sion. In parts of the former Krajina region 
- for example, in the central and south-west-
ern counties of Lika-Senj and Šibenik-Knin 
- Croatia has simultaneously sought to pro-
mote tourism and consolidate the territory 
around former strategic sites. It has done 
this by creating a museum dedicated to the 
war of independence in Karlovac just off the 
main road and by actively encouraging tour-
ism to Plitvice Lakes National Park, a UNESCO 
World Heritage Site, along the north-western 
border of Bosnia.7 During the conflicts in 
Croatia and Bosnia the Plitivice Lakes region 
had been considered endangered but is now 
off UNESCO’s watch list. 
In the eastern part of Croatia, prospects for 
development have been affected by inferior 
systems of communication and a shift in 
development priorities which have refocused 
the state’s attention to the coastal areas and 
major cities. As a result, cities such as Osijek 
are not as well-served as other regions: the 
airport operates on a seasonal basis and many 
travellers find it easier to go via Belgrade or 
Hungarian airports to reach the easternmost 
towns. Also, the eastern areas remain most 
affected by events in neighbouring countries. 
In Eastern Slavonia, where during the 19th 
century the Drava, Sava, and Danube rivers 
connected Croatia to commercial centres in 
Hungary and Serbia, the effects of war, occu-
pation, and NATO’s bombing of the bridges 
in Novi Sad (in neighbouring Serbia) in 1999 
have had a devastating impact on the local 
economy, which continues to the present 
day. Unemployment levels are significantly 
higher than Central European averages and 
economic opportunities remain concen-
trated around the city of Osijek and towards 
the west. In contrast to activities next door 
in Vojvodina (Serbia), the potential exploita-
tion of oil and natural gas has also not been 
developed. While the border area had histori-
cally been a fertile region, much of the land 
around Vukovar and the border with Serbia 
remains mined and hence opportunities for 
agricultural production are restricted. In 
recent years Vukovar has featured on river 
cruises and has drawn some income from 
day-tripping tourists. 
In the southern part of the country, away 
from the coast, the challenges of exploiting 
natural resources have been complicated by 
land ownership issues and the ethno-centric 
polices described above which sought to 
consolidate Croatia’s influence over Western 
Bosnia, above all the ethnic Croat areas of 
Herzegovina. In the early 1990s the Croatian 
government began a programme of set-
tling Bosnian Croats along the borders of 
Herzegovina and in the Dalmatian hinter-
land where large communities of Serbs once 
lived. The settlers were formally invited and 
given full citizenship rights and housing; 
many were given access to the vacant homes 
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owned by ethnic Serbs while others ben-
efited from an active housing construction 
programme (Blitz 2005). While tracts of this 
land are less valuable than in other parts of 
the country, and many of the inhabitants in 
rural areas supported themselves with sub-
sistence farming, the relocation of ethnic 
Croats to this territory has helped national-
ist forces retain considerable influence while 
their leaders reasserted discriminatory poli-
cies. Despite far-reaching efforts by the previ-
ous government to restore property to Serb 
owners throughout Croatia, settlement and 
land use policies complicated the return and 
reintegration of ethnic Serbs.8 
The most politically-sensitive issue regard-
ing the transfer of properties into Croatian 
government control concerns a small num-
ber of former state-owned apartments 
around Dubrovnik, a city which is central to 
the country’s tourist agenda and a power-
ful symbol of its independence from Serbia 
and Montenegro. The case of Krstina Blečić, 
an ethnic Serb who left her apartment at 
the outset of war but did not return within 
the six months required by law to maintain 
her tenancy rights, was referred to the Court 
of Human Rights in Strasbourg which later 
declared it non-admissible on the grounds 
that Croatia had not been party to the 
European Convention at the time the confis-
cation took place. This case, and others like 
it, has called attention to the treatment of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs), not least 
because their number has remained con-
stant for more than a decade.9
Croatia has been fortunate to exploit its 
long coastline and the hundreds of islands 
which offer considerable opportunities for 
sustainable tourism. Away from the coast-
line, however, opportunities to develop 
Croatia’s natural resources have been pro-
foundly marked by war, occupation, and 
subsequent policies of post-conflict devel-
opment and national integration. It should 
be noted that the country’s development 
‘black spots’ were former economic centres 
and once connected the country to impor-
tant markets, especially along the Hungarian 
and Serbian borders. As suggested above, the 
main challenges for the peaceful conversion 
of Croatia’s natural capital are essentially 
political and determined by regional dispar-
ity rather than opportunity. 
Conclusions
The conjuncture of three perspectives has 
informed our novel conceptualisation and 
understanding of the processes shaping a 
post-conflict political-economy paradigm 
of borderland conversion: developmental, 
political, and environmental. 
Recognising that post-conflict develop-
ment does not proceed in a linear manner 
but rather results from the convergence of 
political aspirations, economic potential, 
and technical opportunities, the analysis 
employed here has illustrated the ways in 
which state interests and market forces inter-
act and produce new valuations of natural 
capital and its conversion. We propose a 
number of preliminary conclusions regard-
ing the natural capital conversion process of 
borderland regions. 
First, the evidence of the two selected case 
studies confirms that, contrary to notable 
ecological and UN studies (Benton 1996; 
Dasgupta 2001; Dasgupta 2010; Moog & 
Stones 2009; Perkins 2007), post-conflict 
economic conditions lead to the reconceptu-
alisation away from the often non-monetary 
value of the natural resources of border areas 
to their commercial use value. In the case 
of Cyprus this has been for tourism devel-
opment, substantial urban expansion, and 
more intensive exploitation of agricultural 
resources. In the case of Croatia this has been 
through the development of tourism along 
the coastline and in the Plitvice National 
Park. The ecological value of these assets is 
challenged, or replaced, by their commercial 
value, often for urban-based or export mar-
kets in the global economy. We do not claim 
that this exploitation is solely the result of 
the post-conflict borderland phenomenon; 
the economic propensity to develop the 
land, the locational advantages, and the aspi-
rations of the land owners are significant 
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drivers of the development process every-
where. However, our contention is that the 
economic imperatives of this conversion pro-
cess in post-conflict situations bear on the 
next conclusion. 
Second, the natural capital of border areas 
is often converted, not only for economic 
objectives, but also as a symbolic political 
investment as post-conflict states seek to 
assert (in the case of new borders) or reassert 
(in the case of existing borders) their claims 
to sovereignty by consolidating their territo-
rial identity. This is most evident in southern 
Croatia, along the border with Herzegovina, 
where Croatia had strategic interests and 
sought to maintain influence with Croat 
communities in Bosnia. The evidence pre-
sented above demonstrates how official 
policies at the national level (for example 
tourism development strategies) and at 
the local level (for example urban planning 
and housing policies for settlement expan-
sion and resource exploitation) reinforce 
the state’s territorial claims with their focus 
on border areas. In Cyprus too there is evi-
dence of ‘settling’ the border areas with both 
urban and tourist development. In both case 
studies, despite, or perhaps because of, the 
potential vulnerability of these border areas 
to further disputed claims, states actively pro-
mote the exploitation of the natural capital 
either ignoring or reconciling themselves to 
the concomitant risks of destruction brought 
about by further conflict.
Third, despite our focus on borderlands and 
recognising that the resource and locational 
attributes determine the specifics of natural 
capital conversion of border regions, neither 
the political nor the economic drivers of 
these changes are unique to the border areas. 
Developments taking place elsewhere within 
the post-conflict state inevitably impact how 
the border regions are perceived and valued. 
Similarly, how the natural capital of border 
areas is valued and converted impacts politi-
cal and economic change elsewhere within 
the national entity. Hence, while borders may 
be physically remote and on the periphery, 
they may nonetheless be of central political 
importance in the post-conflict state. This is 
most evident when one considers the legacy 
of Vukovar in Croatia, a town often described 
as the ‘Croatian Stalingrad’. 
Fourth, temporal aspects are crucial. The 
post-conflict impact on borderlands varies 
through time as the national entities assess 
the regions’ potential - both economic and 
political - and explore the modalities for 
developing these areas. The threat or antici-
pation of further boundary changes by mili-
tary incursion or peace negotiations, the 
simple fact that these areas may be mined or 
scattered with unexploded munitions, or the 
processes of establishing new ownership and 
use rights are amongst the main reasons for 
this hiatus. Our evidence suggests that this 
hiatus offers a vital but neglected opportu-
nity for establishing measures for the long-
term protection of the natural capital of 
borderlands, or at least for implementing 
more environmentally-sustainable economic 
development. Recognition that there may 
be gaps during the stages of transition that 
characterise the post-conflict process offers 
the possibility of bringing environmental 
concerns more squarely into the post-con-
flict planning process and hence guarding 
against the depletion of natural resources 
through non-sustainable development prac-
tices, including urbanisation, the building 
of new settlements, or the introduction of 
extractive industries. Such a response would 
go a long way to advancing the Rio+20 
agenda and testing the commitment of inter-
national actors to promote sustainability. 
Fifth, the processes of post-conflict conver-
sion involve actors above and below the state. 
International agencies such as the World 
Bank, the UN, and the EU have promoted 
the instruments of civil society as the corner-
stone of peace and post-conflict reconstruc-
tion in these two case examples. Additionally, 
NGOs have played a critical role in reforming 
civil society and in representing the interests 
of forcibly displaced persons. However, much 
less strong has been the promotion of envi-
ronmental agendas in the development of 
civil society, though this is now recognised in 
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the Rio+20 agenda. Advancing the cause of 
sustainable development and protecting the 
natural heritage from commercial exploita-
tion through citizen groups may provide a 
counterbalance to irresponsible state power. 
Neither in Cyprus nor in Croatia has the 
conversion of the natural capital of border-
lands been significantly influenced by cam-
paigns for environmental activism or social 
justice. These efforts have been noticeably 
muted although are growing in importance 
in other locations and sectors. It is tempting 
to conclude that given the political sensitiv-
ity of borderlands these agendas were sub-
ordinated to the wider political objectives 
of post-conflict states wishing to assert their 
sovereignty claims and consolidate territorial 
identity. We suggest that by including these 
environmental concerns in the post-conflict 
agenda earlier on, and by recognising the 
particularities of border areas in the Rio+20 
agenda, it may be possible to build stronger 
coalitions to protect against the exploita-
tion of natural resources for non-sustainable 
development projects. In this context, the 
role of supranational actors in the promo-
tion of the Sustainable Development Goals 
offers an important platform for advocacy in 
support of cautious development. 
Finally, although our evidence is primar-
ily limited to locations where new borders/
states have been created after conflict, pass-
ing reference to other examples suggests 
that the findings apply where conflict has 
contested existing borders without produc-
ing new ones. In this context, it is impor-
tant to recognise that while borders mark 
physical territory they also demarcate sites 
of political contest which may be mediated 
through political awareness raising, environ-
mental advocacy, and smart diplomacy. 
NOTES
 1 See: ‘Key Sheets for Sustainable Livelihoods: 
Overview’, Department for International 
Development (DFID). 
 2 Although Cyprus EU membership applies 
to the island, de facto it only applies to 
the Greek-Cypriot half of the island, the 
internationally recognised de jure state. 
The Turkish-Cypriot side has no interna-
tional recognition. 
 3 The preservation of natural capital is 
a central element of the Millennium 
Development Goals: Goal Seven records 
a global aim to integrate the principles 
of sustainable development into country 
policies and programmes and reverse the 
loss of environmental resources (UNDP 
2005). 
 4 Under international law, a refugee must 
have crossed an international border. 
Technically, those affected are described 
as Internally Displaced People (IDPs).
 5 Official sources estimate that during the 
first refugee flow approximately 84,000 
Croats fled from areas under Serbian 
control and another 70,000 ethnic 
Serbs, who had been displaced, settled 
in the Danube region. According to the 
Croatian government’s former Office of 
Displaced Persons and Refugees (ODPR) 
approximately 300,000 Serbs had fled by 
the end of the war. Others left when terri-
tory around the Danube was transferred 
to the United Nations to administer in 
1995 and again when this region reverted 
to Croatian government control in 1998 
(See: Blitz 2005).
 6 See Ivo Banac’s ‘What Happened in 
the Balkans (or Rather ex-Yugosla-
via)?’ and Attila Hoare’s ‘The Croatian 
Project to Partition Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
1990–1994’.
 7 The region has historically been of great 
importance. Following the 1699 Treaty of 
Karlowitz Austria maintained a military 
frontier and invited ethnic Serbs to settle 
on the border with the Ottoman lands in 
Bosnia.
 8 During the year the government neared 
completion of its program to return 
illegally occupied homes to their own-
ers; however, the property law implicitly 
favours ethnic Croats over ethnic Serbs 
by giving precedence to the right of 
temporary occupants, who are mainly 
ethnic Croats, to that of original owners, 
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predominantly ethnic Serbs. Owners gen-
erally could not repossess their property 
unless housing was secured for the tem-
porary tenants. (See US State Department 
2007).
 9 See: Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre (IDMC), ‘Croatia: Housing rights 
and employment still preventing durable 
solutions’.
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